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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X-53265 
A PROPULSION ORIENTED STUDY O F  MISSION MODES FOR 
MANNED MARS LANDING 
SUMMARY 
Results are given of a sys tems analysis of manned Mars  landing missions for  
a variety of mission modes, including chemical, nuclear, and electric propulsion, 
and aerodynamic braking. Consistent ground i d e s  and assumptions were used. 
The baseline mission requires  450 days for  execution and places 4 men on the 
surface of M a r s  for  20 days. Advanced missions are discussed. Each mission 
was analyzed assuming first Saturn V,  and then a la rge  reusable Post-Saturn ve­
hicle to be available, in o rde r  to pi-ovide a coinparison. A cost advantage was 
found for  the reusable Post-Saturn for  all  but ve iy  ininiinal planetary programs. 
Of the available technologies, the graphite nuclear rocket was found generally 
preferable to other systems f o r  mission propulsion. Advanced nuclear propul­
sion, such as ORION, was found to have great  iiotential for  advanced missions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Continuation of a vigorous national space program will incorporate planetary 
exploration as p a r t  of the overall exploration and exploitation of space.  At the 
present t ime, the state of space technology limits planetary exploration to un­
inanned probes. It is our  present  belief, however, a s  exemplified by the vigorous 
inanned space flight programs 01 NASA, that the objectives of space exploration 
can lie fully inet oilly by inanned missions. Manned niissions to the planets, and 
especially to Mars ,  have been the subject of a nuinlxr of advanced systeins studies. 
The intent of these studies has  been to  bring into focus the general character  and 
scope of such missions,  to identify the technical advancements needed to inalte 
the missions practical, and to ascer ta in  roughly the cost  of the nlissions and in 
what time frame they might be  feasible. 
With respect  to Mars ,  three general categories of missions have been iden­
tified. The first category, manned flyby missions, appears  to be attainable with 
modest extensions of Saturn/Apollo technology. The second category, ear ly  
inanned stopover and landing missions,  requires substantial technological advance. 
The third category, which could be  considered large -scale exploration, can be 
only roughly forecast  with today's state of knowledge. Many analyses of manned 
stopover missions in the second class have been performed by a number of or ­
ganizations, using a wide variety of groundrules, assumptions, and mission 
modes. Several propulsion concepts have been incorporated into these studies. 
Not surprisingly, conflicting conclusions and recommendations have resulted. 
Since one of the principal benefits of advanced systems studies is to identify those 
areas of teclinology that will have maximum payoff in terms of extension of our  
space capability, it is felt that although manned stopover planetary missions are 
many yea r s  in the future, the t ime is ripe fo r  attempts to resolve some of the 
conflicts by analysis of a variety of mission modes with a common set of ground-
rules  and assumptions. 
This study was initiated in November 1964 to  respond to  a request f rom Dr. 
Mueller, Associate Administrator f o r  Manned Space Flight, to Dr.  Koelle, 
MSFC Future Projects  Office Director. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: F i r s t ,  with common groundrules and 
assumptions, to compare, on the basis of cost  and performance criteria, manned 
planetary stopover missions utilizing several  modes and propulsion systems. The 
second purpose is to present an assessment  of the present state of the art and 
probable development requirements of the propulsion systems considered. 
The author wishes to express  appreciation to those who contributed to the 
analysis which formed the basis of this report .  This especially includes Robert 
G. Voss and T e r r y  H.  Sharpe of the Future Proje.cts Office, who did the cost 
analysis, and Ronald J. Harris of the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Lab­
oratory (Nuclear Group), who provided basic space vehicle mass data. Sincere 
appreciation is also extended to Dr .  Harry  0. Ruppe who provided analysis of 
the electric propulsion systems, and to Dr.  H. Hermann Koelle, who provided 
overall direction of the effort. 
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. A fully reusable Post-Saturn class vehicle in the one million pound 
payload class  will be sound investment toward an efficient manned planetary ex­
ploration program, regardless  of which mission modes are selected. This re­
quirement approaches the "mandatory" status, in case  several  manned planetary 
orbiting and landing missions are planned, using chemical propulsion only. 
2. Continued development of the solid-core nuclear rocket engine in the 
NERVA I1 class is, at this time, identified as the best  strategy toward providing 
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reasonably effective propuLsion fo r  manned planetary missions. It appears as 
good if not bet ter  than, f r o m  a cost and reliabilitystandpoint, all competitors 
with the exception of high-thrust advanced nuclear propulsion concepts. The fu­
ture of the latter concepts cannot be  clearly predicted at present. 
3 .  An initial Mars  landing attempt could b e  performed with Saturn V as 
the launch vehicle, provided that a nuclear rocket sys tem o r  its performance 
equivalent is available, and that extensive orbital operations are used, and that  
the launch of one Mars  ship pe r  launch window is considered satisfactory. 
4. Orbital  launch operations ~villb e  required fo r  a reasonable planetary 
program, regardless  of concepts selected. The single exception in this report ,  
PostSaturn/ORION, appears true only for  the baseline mission, and definitely 
not for  more ambitious missions. 
5. Research toward feasibility of ad-ropulsion should be 
continued aggressively and broadened i n  scope to include al l  concepts that pre­
sently appear promising. These include, but are not necessarily l imited to: nu­
c lear  pulse; gaseous co re  fission; MHD-electric; and fusion-based systems.  If 
such sys tems canbe  developed, they -wil l provide a major  breakthrough in space 
transportation systems,  with the nuclear pulse systems being the leading con­
tender at this point in time. 
These conclusions are discussed fur ther  in  the rfResults*fsection of this 
report .  
SUMMARYO F  GROUND RULES AND CRITERIA 
Major categories of cost  for  the cost analysis were  as follows: 
1. RDT&E costs for  spacecraft  
2. Manufacturing costs f o r  spacecraft  
3. Cost of transportation of spacecraft  to Ear th  orbi t  
4. Ear th  orbit operations burden rate 
5. Share of launch vehicle RDT& E cost assignable to the planetary 
program: F o r  Saturn V uprating, 50% ;and for  Post-Saturn development, 58% 
( i f  applicable) 
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6 .  Development of orbital launch operations, if required 
In o r d e r  to  demonstrate the change in  relative importance of R & D  cost 
and operational cost with the magnitude of planetary mission activity, costs were 
determined f o r  three cases;  I mission, 10 missions, and 100 missions. Although 
it is certainly not reasonable that a larte number of identical missions to the 
same destination would be flown, this assumption was made to simplify the analy­
sis. 'It was assumed that the baseline mission could be  correlated with a variety 
of different planetary missions in a direct  manner. Validity of this assumption 
is briefly discussed in a later section of this report .  
Analysis of orbital operations requirements as based on a rapid estimate,  
parametr ic  method originated by Dr.  H. H. Koelle. r',Each mission type was 
analyzed f o r  two cases: first, assuming the use of uprated Saturn V vehicles, 
160 tons payload into 485 k m  orbit; and then the use  of large,  reusable, Post-
Saturn ( 2  ) vehicles, 455 tons payload into 485 k m  orbit, f o r  delivering space 
vehicle systems to Earth orbit. Orbital operations cargo flights were assumed 
to use  uprated Saturn V's ,  and passenger flights were assumed to use  a reusable 
orbital transport .  ( 3  ) The following cost  and reliability assumptions were em­
ployed : 
I. Mission reliability of Saturn V: 0. 92 
2.  Mission reliability of Post-Saturn: 0. 95 
3.  Mission reliability of reusable orbital transport:.  0. 98 
4. Orbital assembly and preparation: .take place over  a 90-day period 
p r io r  to orbital launch. 
5:' Space vehicle reliability: 0. 98 p e r  propulsive stage; 0. 95 p e r  
aerodynamic braking maneuver. 
reliability) '.6. 25 Probability of meeting orbit launch window = (Orbital operations 
7 .  Orbital operations reliability ve r sus  number of missions in pro­
gram: 
1 Mission 10 Missions 100 Missions 
p e r  assembly operation 0. 96 0.97 0.98 
p e r  'tanking operation 0.98 0.985 0 .99  
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8. Unreliability of orbital operations is assumed largely compen­
sated f o r  by additional launches and is considered in  orbital mass and cost bur­
dens. However, p e r  assumption 6 ,  this is assumed to be not entirely successful. 
9. Reliability of spacecraft life support and of Mars  Excursion 
Module (MEM) is not considered, as these items enter identically into every 
mission. 
10. Launch facilities cost  burden: Some of the missions analyzed 
required very high launch rates in o r d e r  to complete the orbital assembly and 
launch within 90 days. Cost burdens fo r  extra launch facilities was added to 
launch vehicle RDT& E as follows: 
a. F o r  each Saturn V launch in excess of 8 in 90 days: $ 2 5  
million 
b. F o r  each Post-Saturn launch in excess of 4 in 90 days: $ 75 
million 
11. RDT& E and production costs are given in Table 111. 
Mission modes were compared on the basis of several  c r i te r ia .  The 
criteria were typical of those used in value analysis and were intended to indi­
cate relative attractiveness of the various mission modes. The most important 
c r i te r ia  were: 
1. Total cost p e r  mAn-day on Mars  
2 .  Total R&D expenditure up to and including f i r s t  mission attempt 
BASELINE MISSION AND MISSION MODES 
Baseline Mission. The baseline mission was chosen to exemplify a first-
generation stopover at Mars .  Although other planets might have been Considered, 
Mars  was chosen on the basis of its being of principal interest  at the present t ime, 
and because it was desired to r e s t r i c t  the analysis to a single target  planet fo r  
the sake of brevity. Characterist ics of the baseline mission are given inTable I. 
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TABLE I 
BASELINE MISSION CHARACTERISTICS 
Mission Duration 
Mission Year  
Crew Size 
Crew to  Mars  Surface 
Surface Staytime 
Mission Module Mass 
Mars  Excursion Module Mass 
Earth Reentry Module Mass 
Life Support Expendables 
Midcourse Corrections : Outbound 
Inbound 
Maximum Allowed Earth Entry Speed 
Mars  Excursion Module Mass Breakdown: 
Initial Mass 
Descent Propellant 
Dry  Weight for  Descent 
Life Support and Equipment 
Ascent Liftoff Mass 
A s  cent Propellant 
Dry Mass 
Payload Returned to Earth Return 
Vehicle 
450 days (approx. ) 

1984 opposition 

8 men 

4 men 

20 days 

38.6 tons 

36.4  tons 

6 tons 

22. 8 kg/day 
100 m/sec 
100 m/sec 
15  km/sec 
36. 4 tons 
6 .68  tons 
5.46 tons 
6. 82 tons 
17. 4 tons 
12.57 tons 
4.19 tons 
0.68 tons 
System performance assumptions were as follows: 
1. Cryogenic (LOX/LH,) chemical propulsion: C=4300 m/sec (ex­
haust velocity) 
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i , 
~ 
i ! 
2 .  Solid-core nuclear propulsion: C= 7850 m/sec 
3. Nuclear pulse (ORION) propulsion: C = 18,150 m/ssc 
4. Storable chemical propulsion: C= 3240 m/sec 
5. Electric propulsion: 9 kg (mass) /kW jet; exhaust velocity var i ­
able in optimum manner. 
6 .  Aerodynamic braking at Mars:  Aero-braking s t ructure  and heat 
shield mass  18. 5% of useful mass delivered to Mars  orbit, 100 m/sec velocity 
requirement for  circularization maneuver on storable chemicals following aero­
braking. 
(NOTE: It is assumed that Earth approach speed in excess of 1 5 . 2  km/sec 
is reduced to that speed by propulsive braking with storable chemical propellants 
a t  an Isp of 3 , 2 4 0  m/sec ,  except for  mission inodes employing electric o r  ORION 
propulsion, in which case the pr imary propulsion system is used. ) 
Excursions on tlie baseline mission included: 
1. Missions for  yea r  of opposition 1993, a representative "difficult" 
year .  
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2 .  Return to a synchronous Earth orbit  ra ther  than direct  entry 
(consideTed only for  electric and nuclear propulsion systems)  . 
3 .  The use of multiples of this baseline mission to represent more 
ambitious space programs.  
The baseline mission profile consists of four iiiteiylaiietary t ransfer  
maneuvers plus Mars  excursion and auxiliary maneuvers which occur as noted 
below. Data were oljtained f rom several  sources .  ( 4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  7 )  
Earth Departure. F o r  high-thrust systems,  a single pi-opulsive period to 
t ransfer  injection is employed. After one-third of the t ransfer  coast period has 
been completed, expended life support s tores  and the Enrtli escape stages are 
jettisoned and a storable propellant midcourse correction i s  executed; a 100 m/sec 
velocity increment is provided. Low-thrust systems ( electric propulsion) are 
boosted by a high-thrust sys tem (cryogenic chemical o r  solid core  nuclear) to 
1oca1 ( ge  ocelitric ) parabolic v e1ocity , f ol1owing wvli ich 1ow-th rust propul sion 
is initiated. Although a very  elemeiitaiy analysis will show that high-thrust boost=! 
I 	 to local parabolic velocity is not optimal with reward to iiiiiiiiiiiziiig initial mass ,  
tlie deviation f rom optiinuin is in  general small .  P 8  ) Low-tlii-ust systems a r e  as ­
sumed to make course corrections continuously; no penalty is assumed. 
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Mars Arr ival .  Mars  a r r iva l  may employ a high-thrust propulsive maneu­
v e r  t o  attain a c i rcu lar  orbit about Mars ,  a low-thrust spiraling into c i rcu lar  o r ­
bit, or aerodynamic braking in Mars  atmosphere.  In the last  ca se ,  the vehicle 
t ra jectory enters the Mars  atmosphere in  such a way that it will skip out again 
after having achieved the required velocity decrement.  After  skip-out, storable 
liquid rocket propulsion is used to c i r c d a r i z e  into a stable orbit  about Mars .  
Aerodynamic l i f t  modulation and sophisticated onboard guidance a r e  implied. 
Mars  Surface. Excursion. The Mars  Excursion Module separates  f rom 
the interplanetary spacecraft ,  with the descent c rew aboard; re t rof i re  ( storable 
or solid propellants) initiates controlled entry. Atmospheric braking is followed 
by a parachute descent, with rocket landing s imi l a r  t o  that of the LEM. The 
descent crew is not provided with surface mobility other than walking in a p res ­
s u r e  suit.  Limited capability is assumed for  carrying instruments down and 
sa'mples up. The MEM se rves  as a shelter during surface stay; it is assumed 
to consist of a descent stage (which incorporates the aerodynamic heat shield, 
parachutes, and landing rockets ) ,  and two ascent s tages  employing storable pro­
pellants. The ascent velocity increment of roughly 5 km/sec nearly precludes 
single-stage ascent with storable propellants. The ascent terminates with ren­
dezvous with the interplanetary spacecraft and t ransfer  of the crew and samples .  
M a r s  Departure. P r i o r  to M a r s  departure, spent life-support s tores  , 
spent stages, and the spent MEM stage a r e  jettisoned. F o r  high-thrust systems,  
M a r s  departure takes place'with a single propulsive maneuver to t ransfer  injec­
tion. Low-thrust sys tems must sp i ra l  out to escape and t ransfer .  One-third to 
one-half of the way along the t ransfer ,  provision is made for  a 100 m/sec mid-
course correction with storable propellants. If Venus swingby is to be employed, 
the initial injection is to Venus t ransfer .  One hundred m/sec course corrections 
a r e  provided between Mars  and Venus and between Venus and Earth. The swing-
by itself is non propulsive. No scientific payloads (p robes ,  etc. ) were assumed 
for  the Venus encounter. 
Earth Arrival, F o r  those modes incorporating direct  entry into Ear th ' s  
atmosphere, propulsive braking was assumed as needed to reduce entry velocity 
to no grea te r  than 15.2 km/sec. If nuclear pulse propulsion o r  electric propul­
sion were used fo r  previous maneuvers, they were assumed available fo r  Earth 
braking. Other mission modes used storable chemical propulsion for the braking 
maneuver. Electric propulsion and nuclear pulse missions, which entered a high-
altitude (24-hour) orbit upon Earth a r r iva l ,  were a l so  studied. Electric propul­
sion spiraled into this orbit, whereas the ( highTthrust) nuclear pulse used a three-
impulse maneuver. ( ) 
Selected Mission Modes. Table II summarizes  the baseline vehicle con­
cepts and mission modes with which this study was begun. Modes 13 and 14 were 
not analyzed in detail because a means of even roughly optimizing the mission 
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TABLE 11 
MISSION/PROPULSION SYSTEM MATRIX 
I 
Orbit Orbit 	 Earth 
Return 
Direct Entry Capture 
(50,000 ft/sec in 24 h r .  
Max. Speed) Orbit 
Braking 
I I X 
9 
-. . 
was not available in time. Modes I ,  3, 6 ,  10, 12 and 15 were selected f o r  p re s ­
entation in  this summary report. At a later date, a detailed report  will be issued 
covering all modes and giving additional details. Most of the "difficultf1y e a r  
mission details are excluded f rom this report 'because Venus swingby data were  
not available fo r  the selected "difficult" year .  
METHODS OF ANALYSIS (SUMMARY) 
Hardware and propellant mass requirements f o r  Modes 1, 3, 10 and 12 
(Table 11) were determined by an initial mass optimization computer program 
developed by STL(5) . This program, developed pr imari ly  f o r  solid-core nuclear 
propulsion mission analysis, is also capable of analyzing chemical propulsion 
and aerodynamic braking modes. Propulsion performance data were assumed 
as previously noted, and parametr ic  relations were used to compute inert  weights 
f o r  propulsion modules. These relations were based on conceptual design studies, 
but assumed tank s i zes  to be tailored to each application in o r d e r  to  minimize 
inerts.  Chemical rocket engines were assumed to be available at whatever thrust  
level was desired.  Solid-core nuclear engines were assumed as the NERVA II 
concept (230,000 lbs of t h rus t ) .  The optimum number of these engines f o r  each 
phase of a mission was selected by the program. Typical propellant fractions, 
(mass of propellant) /(initial mass  of stage, including engines),  are: 
1. Cryogenic chemical ( LOX/LH2) : 90% 
2. Nuclear (LH,) : 77.4% 
3. Storable chemical ( N204/Hydrazineblend) : 89.5'70 
Propellant fraction was dependent on stage s ize  which explains why the cry­
ogenic example (slightly larger than an S-11) is better than the storable example 
(slightly l a r g e r  than a Titan 11) . Allowances f o r  insulation and meteoroid pro­
tection were included. 
Nuclear pulse data were adapted f rom a study by General Dynamics/Gen­
era1 Atomic. Assumed nuclear pulse Isp was previously given; other data are 
as follows :( 7 ) 
1. Engine Diameter: 10 meters  
2. Engine Thrust: 355 tons 
3. Engine Mass: 91 tons 
The nuclear pulse system was not staged. This propulsion module was 
used f o r  all nuclear pulse mission modes. Pulse propellant units were assumed 
10 
carr ied in magazines which were G ~ of the mass of pulse units they carr ied,  
and which were jettisoned when emptied. 
Electric propulsion data were adopted f rom a Rand study ( 4 ) .  Assumed 
performance, as noted, was gkg/kW jet with Isp varied in optimal manner. 
The specific mass figure includes electric powerplant mass ,  power conditioning 
rnass, thrustor mass ,  support structure mass, power losses  in power condition­
ing, and thrustor inefficiency. Propellant and propellant tankage mass  were con­
sidered separately. Data fo r  parabolic injection stages were hand-calculated 
using the parametr ic  analysis f rom the STL study. ( 5  
Ground rules  and assumptions f o r  cost and reliability analysis were p re ­
viously given. Development costs for  uprated Saturn V and Post-Saturn launch 
vehicles were taken f rom detailed cost studies of these vehicles. ( l o  ' 16) Other 
development costs were taken f rom p r io r  MSFC in-house studies of advanced 
missions ) o r  e s t i m t e d  by the Program Analysis and Control Group of the 
MSFC Future Projects  Office. Principal cost data are  given in Table 111. 
Uprated Saturn V 
Post  -S atu I-n 
Standa rd N u  c1ea1' Module 
Nuclear Electric Propul­
sion Module 
ORION 
Spacecraft 
Aerobraking Module 
TABLE I11 
MAJOR COST ITEMS 
(Millions of Dollars) 
FIRST 
R&D COST UNIT 
2000 109 
9000 70/Shot 
4700 35 
4500 300 
8000 70 
9000 315 
1000 100 
LEARNING PRIOR 
CURVE UNITS 
90% 72 
100% ­
100% ­
100% ­
100% -
Cost and orbital operations analysis required generating specific con­
ceptual interplanetary vehicle designs. Major hardware i tems inalting up these 
designs are given in the next section of this report, along with principal mass  
data. The orbital operations analysis utilized a simple computer routine based 
on a parametr ic  analysis by Dr.  H .  H.  Koelle. Total orbital mass ,  cost, and 
crew s i ze  required fo r  orbital operations were calculated, and the number of 
additional launch vehicle flights to place this inass in orbit was determined. 
Launch and mission crew transport  were assumed to use a reusable transport  
vehicle. Figure 1 is a logic chart  suiiiiiiarizing tlie process  of analysis. 
Final outputs of the analysis were the data required by the principal c r i ­
teria. Total expenditure to first mission attempt was taken as the calculated 
total cost for  one mission. The baseline mission, successfully executed, would 
provide 80 man-days on Mars. Total cost p e r  man-day on Mars  was determined 
f 1'0 111: 
where : 
C is total cost
T 
Cin is total cost p e r  man-day on M a r s  
N is number of baseline inissions attempted 
-
R is tlie estimated iiiission reliabilitym 
RESULTS O F  ANALYSIS 
Results of tlie analysis aiid calculations are  sunimarizecl in Taljles I 3 7  
through VI  for  tlie mission modes of principal interest .  Orbital operations data 
and iiiission reliability were dependent on the nuniljer of iiiissioiis attempted. 
These tables give these data only for  the case of 10 niissioii attempts. * Final 
outputs of total operating cost pe r  man-day on Mars are  given for  1, IO, and 
100 iiiissions. F o r  all cases, orbital operations niass burden \\'asassulilecl to 
be handled by Saturn V ' s .  Although this may seem inconsistent where Post-Saturn 
vehicles a r e  used in the same mission, it is likely that tlie nature of orbital oper­
ations will be such that launches for  its support will preferably be divided into 
small units ( m o r e  nearly of Saturn V payload size) aiid launched a t  intervals dur­
ing the period of orbital preparation of tlie space vehicle. 
Total costs for  one mission fo r  each of the principal modes a re  shown i n  
Figure 2. Saturn V and Post-Saturn cases  are given. A s  previously noted, R& D 
costs include 50% of tlie estimated costs of uprating Saturn V,  o r  507'0 of the e s ­
timated costs of developing Post-Saturn. Al l  of the estimated costs for space­
12  
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TABLE IV 

HARDWARE TYPE AND MASS RESULTS SUMMARY 

-
i:ccc 3:CAS 
MISSION (All- (Chemical 
MODE Chemical) Aerobraking 
V .  Swingby) 
“3, 2350 1059
TONS 
-
.,> .L 
MASS IN -,- -,. 

MARS ORBIT 315 290 

TONS 

. . .  . ._. 
:g 
TOTALDRY 289 177
MASS 
EARTH 3 Mod. 1 
DEPARTURE s-rI Mod. S-II 
STAGE 
MARS 1 Aerobraking 
ARRIVAL MOD Aero-shell 
STAGE S-IT Mass=52 T. 
MARS 1 Storable 
DEPARTURE MOD Chemical 
STAGE S-NB 
.. . . 
EARTH Storable Storable 
ARRIVAL brake, d i r .  brake,  d i r .  
entry entry 
Initial mass i n  Ea r th  orbit .  
::* 
6:NEE. 1 0 : N ”  
(Nuclear,  (All  
E lec t r ic )  Nuclear) 
..... 
724 834 

Not 

Calculated 210 

258 194 
2 
Elec t r ic  SNM 
(1 e n d  
1 
Elec t r ic  SNM 
Elec t r ic  Storable 
brake,  d i r .  brake,  d i r .  
entry entry 
12:NAS 

(Nuclear,  15: 

Aerobraking ORION 

V. Swingby) 
746 377 
290 120 

195 121.5 

3 10-meter 

SNM ORION 

( 2  eng) 

Aerobraking 

Aero-shell 10-meter 

Mass=52 T. ORION 

Storable 10-meter 

Chemical ORION 

Storable ORION 

brake, d i r .  brake,  d i r .  

entry entry 

Does not include c rew living module o r  Earth entry module. 
+ Standard nuclear module: 33-ft diameter LH, tank, with o r  without NERVA I1 engine. 
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TABLE V 
ORBITAL OPERATIONS RESULTS SUMMARY 
1:ccc 6:NEE 12:NAS 
MISSION 

CODE (All  Aerobraking ORION 1
( N u 7 
ORBITAL 
Ops Mass 
burden, 
tons -. 
S A T V  * 
Launches 
to  support  
Orb. Ops.  -
ORB. OPS. 
COST, $IO6 
P e r  

Mission- . 

LAUNCHES SAT V SAT V SAT V 

to place
Ev::: * in 7 6 4 

.~Orbit  =- ~ .. 2 1 
MISSION SAT V SAT V 
RELI­
ABILITY 
.a4 .836 .837 .822 . 904 ,- - ­
~~ 
' 
F o r  the 10 mission case.  
4, .I_1.~,. Interplanetary space vehicle. 
TABLE VI 
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS SUMMARY 
Mode 1 3 6 10 12 15 - ____ 
~ ~ .-
T-.b _ c T i - :I 3 0 9 _ - 310 1 272 -51 308 356 

p e r  r 10 1 67 

Man-day I I00 1 36 

on MARS 
__ - __ 

' 
Total operating cost  i n  millions of dollars p e r  manday. Values are shown f o r  1, 10, and 100 
missions,  and fo r  Saturn V and Post-Saturn Launch sys t ems  (left-hand and right-hand numbers,  
respectively) . 
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SATURN V ONLY J 8 . 1 6 1  IMODE 1 :  CCC 
POST -SATURN 20.538 ___- J 
~~ - .__ 
17-421 -lP~.-. MODE 3 : CAS 
.. .20.524 ~ ..I
~~ 
~ -. . .-
. .  
1 9 . 7 8 6  
23.647 
1 I MODE 10 : NNN 
21.325-. 1 MODE 12 : NAS 
25.263 ~ ~~ _J 
- .  ~~ 
22.870. 
J MODE 15 : ORION 26,555 
~~ 
25.454 .- l... 
~. I MODE 6 : NEE 2 9 . 0 0 1 - - . .. .. . 
_ _ ~  L­. I ~ ~. L ~.~~ 
10 20 30 
FIGURE 2. TOTAL COST FOR FIRST MISSION ATTEMPT 
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0 
craft  R&D are included. No costs are included for  preliminary missions such 
as Voyager-type probes, o r  manned planetary flybys. Tes t  flights included in 
the R& D costs do not include extensive operations involving trial flights to Mars ,  
but do include a nominal allowance ( severa l  Saturn V flights) for  development 
of orbital operations, and Earth orbital test flights of space vehicle hardware 
and systems. 
Of those mission modes considered, some of the more  efficient appear to  
be feasible using uprated Saturn V's  if one ship p e r  attempt is acceptable. Mode 
12, including orbital operations, is estimated to  require 9 Saturn V's ,  Mode 15, 
6 Saturn V's,  Mode 6 and Mode 10, 11 Saturn V ' s  pe r  space vehicle leaving 
Earth orbit. These requirements imply stockpiling of launch vehicles and pay­
loads, and a launch every 8 to  15 days in o rde r  to l imit  orbital preparation to 
90 days. Unreliability of launch vehicles and additional launches thereby a r e  
taken into account in the orbital operations analysis. Additional launch facilities 
would undoubtedly be required; this matter needs further study. Mode 3, requir­
ing 15 Saturn V ' s  s eems  marginal, and Mode I ,  requiring 34, is quite unattrac­
tive and might not be feasible. 
Total program costs are shown in Figure 3.  These a r e  approximate curves 
for  purposes of illustration. The most expensive program, Mode I with Saturn 
VIS, is $ 226 billion. The least expensive program, ORION with Post-Saturn, 
is $ 56 billion. Costs fo r  the additional mission modes not reported in detail 
herein fall within this range. 
Additional plots used Mode 10 as a baseline. Figure 4 shows cost per  
man-day on M a r s  as a function of number of missions, for  Mode' 10 executed 
with Saturn V and Post-Saturn. Figure 5 shows the same data replotted with the 
Post-Saturn mode expressed in percent of the Saturn V mode. 
Mode.comparisons a r e  given in the format of Figure 5. Figure 6 compares 
the modes in t e r m s  of Mode IO, cost per  man-day, for  Saturn V ;  Figure 7 does 
the s a m e  thing for  Post-Saturn. In general, it appears that the all-nuclear mode 
is about as good as any of the others and better than some, with the single ex­
ception of the advanced nuclear propulsion, represented by ORION. If another 
form of advanced nuclear propulsion, such as the gas-core rocket, were developed 
to approximately the performance level used in this analysis for  ORION, s imilar  
cost results would be expected. When one compares the development status of the 
nuclear rocket with the status of competitive systems, one is led to  conclude 
that at this point in t ime the nuclear rocket is the best  choice of these systems 
for  ear ly  manned M a r s  landing missions. At  a la te r  date, we may p r e s u e  that 
some form of advanced nuclear propulsion will be developed fo r  planetary missions. 
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Research on known concepts f o r  advanced nuclear propulsion should be encouraged. 
Principal advantages of the Post-Saturn indicated by this and other studies 
are three in number. First, the full reusability of this vehicle concept, coupled 
with its large size, results in a predicted delivery-to-orbit cost of about 1/3 
that of Saturn V, in  t e r m s  of dollars p e r  pound of payload. Second, the large 
payload mass and volume allow a much greater  degree of pre-assembly of the 
space vehicle before launch, and thereby reduce greatly the amount and cost of 
orbital operations required to accomplish a mission attempt. Thirdly, the num­
b e r  of separate  launch operations to be performed during the period of mission 
preparation is greatly reduced. Thus, the results of this study agCee generally 
with other resul ts  ('' ) , which show that the reusable Post-Saturn vehicle 
will provide large savings in an  extensive space program. 
The nuclear rocket resul ts ,  showing it in a favorable light, are dependent 
on developing means ( either effective insulation o r  hydrogen reliquefaction sys  ­
tems)  for  handling the liquid hydrogen propellarkfor long durations (up to roughly 
14months) in the space environment. If insulation were the selected method, it 
further assumes  that the usable volume of a 33-foot outside-diameter tank would 
not be severely reduced by insulation volume. Nuclear rocket specific impulse 
fo r  this study was assumed to be 7850 m/sec. This is conservative; it is probable 
that an operational graphite engine will attain about 8300 m/sec, in which case 
mission costs would be reduced by a few percent. 
The requirement to develop orbital operations for  planetary missions seems 
to be almost inevitable. Alternate courses of action are the development of a 
very large ( roughly 1000 tons payload in orbit)  Post-Saturn o r  development of'  
advanced nuclear propulsion, in time for  initial manned planetary missions. These 
alternates are both extremely unlikely. 
Use of uprated Saturn V for  initial planetary missions, as noted, implies 
stock-piling of vehicles. Either additional launch facilities beyond those pres  ­
ently p'lanned, o r  a stretchout of the orbital assembly period to more than 90 days 
will also be required. Stochastic studies of the capabilities of Saturn V launch 
operations for  "rapid-fire" launch should be conducted. (Means for doing this 
'are under development by the MSFC Aero-Astrodynamics Laboratory). 
Advanced nuclear propulsion, such as ORION, would increase flexibility 
and capability for  planetary misgions to a considerable degree. The t rue poten­
tial of advanced nuclear propulsion is not revealed by the baseline mission analy­
sis. Further  discussion of this mat ter  is given in the "Excursions f rom Baseline 
Mission" section of 'this report .  Several schemes for  advanced nuclear propul­
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sion have been progosed. Electr ic  propulsion with a n  advanced kightweight power 
supply could be considered advanced nuclear propulsion, even though the 9kg/ jkW 
sys tem was at best only competitive with the all nuclear sys tem in this analysis. 
Thermionic reac tors  o r  reactor-driven MHD sys tems may ultimately reach the 
4-5kg/jkW level. I� should be  fur ther  noted that the electric sys tems show up to 
best advantage for high A V ,  long dpration missions. Although high I 
SP 
at high 
thrust is preferable to low thrust, proposed high-thrust high-I sys tems have 
SP 
problems ( s e e  the "Development Implications" section of this report)  not shared 
by electric propulsion. Other important advanced nuclear systems concepts 
known to the wr i t e r  besides ORION and lightweight electric a r e  the gas core  
nuclear rocket, MHD hybrids, (13) and thermonuclear concepts. Basic thermo­
nuclear research  (not propulsion-oriented)' is being actively pursued by AEC. 
Of the other advanced concepts, research  on only the gas-core is being funded 
at anything like an  adequate level. 
EXCURSIONS FROM BASELINE MISSION 
Three  excursions f rom the baseline mission were investigated briefly: 
1. Mission in  a "difficult" year ;  1993 was selected as representative 
2.  Return to high altitude Earth orbit instead of direct  entry. 
3'. Ambitious missions. 
I tems 1 and 2 above were  also combined; i t em 3 included 1 and 2 plus grea te r  
payload, longer stopover duration, and more rapid t ransfers .  
The "difficult" year  mission, if executed with three impulsive propulsion 
maneuvers initiated in planetary orbit, requires  substantially more delta V than 
the "easy" year  mission, principally because of the eccentricity of M a r s '  orbit. 
With continuous propulsion, as provided by the low thrust electric system, the 
variation f rom "good" to l'bad" yea r s  is substantially reduced. In the absence 
of detailed analytical data, it was assumed fo r  this study that the electric sys­
tems would incur a 15% initial mass  penalty in a "difficult" year .  
In most "difficult" years ,  the delta V requirements may be reduced to 
essentially the "easy" year  case by employing an  unpowered Venus swingby. ( 1 4 )  
A modest ( 2 0  to 50 day) t r i p  t ime penalty is usually required i f  proper  advantage 
of the swingby is to be gained. Consistent data on swingby modes were not a­
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vailable for  inclusion in  this report. It is expected that they will be generated 
pr ior  to preparation of the detailed repor t  on this study. Some relaxation of 
delta V requirements in  "difficult" years  can also be obtained by use  of additional 
propulsive maneuvers.  To  the wr i te r ' s  knowledge this situation has  not yet 
been adequately analyzed. Additional maneuvers would present ser ious problems 
if  required of graphite nuclear rocket stages, but should be routine fo r  s torable  
chemical o r  nuclear pulse propulsion. The Venus swingby does represent  an  
added complexity to the mission, and would probably not be used where the pro­
pulsion sys tem could accommodate the high delta V without severe  penalty. Ini­
tial masses  in Earth orbit  fo r  the 1993 missions without swingby are shown in 
Figure 8, f o r  nuclear rocket and nuclear pulse. Return to Earth orbit require­
ments are also shown fo r  .the nuclear pulse in  1993 and electric propulsion 
in 1984. Of par t icular  significance is the relative insensitivity of the nuclear 
pulse system to added mission requirements.  The Earth orbit  re turn  in 1993 
was not analyzed fo r  other sys tems because of the large penalties involved. (A 
relaxtion of the mission duration l imit  would make this mission practical with 
electric propulsion. ) 
The performance data for the nuclear pulse system used in this report  
a r e  believed to be conservative Initial mass  calculations using more optimistic 
(classified) performance data i1.5 ) indicated that all of the missions studied, 
including re turn  to Ear th  orbit in 1993, could be accomplished by direct  injection 
(no orbital operations) using a Post-Saturn to place the vehicle in  orbit. 
A representative ambitious mission is tabulated in  Table VII. This mis­
sion is felt to be indicative of the scope of operations required to begin true ex­
ploratio; of Mars  (as contrasted to a n  excursion) . 
TABLE VI1 
ADVANCED MISSION CHAMCTERISTICS 
Crew Size 

Mars  Surface Crew Size 

Mars Stopover Duration 

Earth Departure Date 

Mars  Arr ival  Date 

Mars  Departure Date 

Earth Arr ival  Date 

100 day t ransfer  
120 day stay on Mars  
100 day t ransfer  
20 men 
20 men 
120 days 
J. D. 2448820 
J. D. 2448920 
J .  D. 2449040 
J. D. 2449140 
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TABLE VII (Cont'd) 
Velocity Increments : Total 
Maneuver No. 1 
Maneuver No. 2 
Maneuver No. 3 
Maneuver No. 4 ( to  24-hr 
Earth orbit) 
Crew Living Module Mass  
(including life support) 
All-up 	Mass of M a r s  Excursion 
Modules ( Hydrogen-Oxygen Propellants) 
Mass  of Exploration Hardware: Total 
Inflatable Shelters 
Roving Vehicles 
Life Support Stores 
Roving Vehicle Propellant and Spares 
Scientific Laboratory and Equipment 
Nuclear Reactor Power Supply 
Roving Vehicle Propellant Rever te r  
Packaging 
Mass  of Mars  Landers Required to Land 
Exploration Hardware 
72.3 km/sec 
16 km/sec 
2 I. 5 km/sec 
18.8 km/sec 
16 km/sec 
70 tons 
2 @ 70 tons each 
100 tons 
2 42 11.5 tons each 
4 42 4 . 5  tons each 
22 tons 
4 .5  tons 
9 tons 
9 tons 
9 tons 
5.5 tons 
90 tons 
This. mission can be accomplished with the indicated t ransfer  t imes using 
high performance (I5) nuclear pulse propulsion, with two IO-meter vehicles in 
Earth orbit with an all-up initial mass of 3,750 tons. As specified, this mission 
is out of the-question for  any other of the propulsion sys tems studied. It can, 
however, be accomplished with graphite nuclear rockets by making several  com­
promises:  
1. M a r s  staytime reduced to 90 days. 
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FIGURE 8 .  	 INITIAL iWASS COMPARISON FOR EXCURSIONS 
ON BASELINE MISSION 
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2. Transfer  t imes  extended to  220-250 days each way. 
3.  Return to Ear th  via  direct  entry r a the r  than Earth orbit. 
4. Scientific payload returned to Earth reduced to  a minimum. 
Required initial mass  in  5000-6000 tons. In t e r m s  of initial mass, this mission 
is equal to roughly 7 baseline missions. In t e r m s  of man-days on Mars ,  it is 
equivalent t o  about 30 baseline missions. In terms of knowledge to  be gained 
by the extended exploration, there  is no meaningful comparison because of the 
great advantage given to the ambitious mission by landing the 100 tons of mission 
support and exploration equipment. 
The baseline mission is probably roughly equivalent to a manned Jupi ter  
flyby, with a substantially longer mission duration. The equivalence will be de­
pendent on the mission mode; much more favorable fo r  high specific impulse 
systems.  It also may be equivalent to a Venus landing mission, but this mission 
would require  a vastly super ior  excursion module; the re-orbit delta V require­
ment will be about 3 km/sec higher than for  Mars .  The greater density of Venus 
atmosphere is a fur ther  burden. Mission equivalences will be investigated in 
fur ther  detail fo r  the detail report  on this study. 
DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS 
Uprating of the payload capacity of the two-stages Saturn V to 160 tons in 
a 485-km orbit was assumed f o r  this study, representing roughly a 60 percent 
increase in payload capacity. Saturn V improvement studies have indicated a 
variety of ways that this could be accomplished. A typical example, and not nec­
essar i ly  the bes t  choice, would be  lengthening the S-IC stage fo r  increased pro­
pellant capacity, strapping on 120-inch solid booster motors,  lengthening the 
S-I1 stage f o r  increased propellant capacity, and using higher thrust, higher;. 
performance engines on the S-I1 stage. In general, f o r  planetary missions, it 
appears  that the l a r g e r  the Saturn V payload mass and envelope, the better.  
Employment of Saturn stages, such as the S-11 o r  S-IVB, as orbit launch 
vehicles for  manned planetary landing missions, appears  to be an unattractive 
approach. Such a development effort would be quite substantial, particularly in 
developing cryogenic insulation techniques and orbital operations. It is , however, 
quite possible that Saturn stages as orbit launch vehicles would be very  attractive 
for less demanding missions, such as M a r s  flyby o r  Venus orbiter.  Insulation 
and orbital operations technology will, of course, be indirectly applicable to 
other systems.  
A s  noted, development of a la rge  Post-Saturn recoverable launch vehicle 
will be a very  good investment fo r  any manned planetary exploration program of 
I meaningful magnitude. There seems  at the present t ime to be no particular u r ­
1 
gency about the initiation of such a vehicle development. Initiation in the ear ly  
1970's would presumably be soon enough. Meanwhile, development of ballistic 
I
I 	 recovery technology for launch vehicles should be pursued vigorously. Recovery 
of both stages is essential fo r  realization of the projected economic benefits of 
a la rge  Post-Saturn vehicle. Much more  basic technology data must be developed 
in  this a r e a  before credible designs of recovery systems for  such vehicles can be 
I 
I
n 	
initiated. Improvements in  propulsion technology in the area of rocket engine 
performance reliability and reusability will also be great  benefit to such a vehicle.c
I Electric propulsion was not reflected in  this report  as superior  to the 
graphite nuclear rocket. Because of the grea t  difference in character is t ics  be­
l tween electric propulsion and the graphite rocket, this conclusion must be treated 
i with considerable caution. The following specific comments apply: 
1 .  Attractiveness of electric propulsion is very  sensitive to the 
specific power assumed, and a l so  to mission duration. Relatively modest in­
creases  in mission duration can result  in substantial reductions in required ini-
I 
tial mass .  
2. Electric propulsion will be particularly attractive for long-range, 
high-velocity, one-way probe misgions. 
3 .  If mission duration l imits a r e  not too s t r ic t ,  the comparison of 
electric propulsion with 'the graphite rocket for  higher velocity manned missions 
will be much more favorable. 
It should further be noted that development of nuclear-electric power supplies up 
to the several  hundred kilowatt range will be required for establishment of extra­
t e r r e s t r i a l  ( i .e .  , lunar  and planetary) bases whether o r  not electric power is 
used for  propulsion. 
Figures 9 and 10 show a predicted development schedule and cost for a one 
megawatt nuclear-electric power plant of the Rankine cycle type ( s imi l a r  to 
SNAP-50). These data a r e  abstracted f rom the previously noted RAND study. ( 4 )  
In the last year  o r  two, prospects for  development of thermionic nuclear-electric 
systems have brightened considerably. Thermionic sys tems offer the potential 
advantage of very  high o rde r  redundancy, simplicity, and low weight. If tliese 
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advantages can be  substantiated in practice, shor te r  duration and less expensive 
development schedules may b e  possible. At the present time, funding for thermio­
nic systems is at a very  low level. Increased activity in this area to the extent 
of providing an  ear ly  proof of feasibility is strongly recommended. 
The graphite nuclear rocket presently appears  to be the bes t  bet for  ear ly  
manned planetary landing missions. Detailed forecasts  of development schedules 
are classified. However, it appears  that the total investment required to develop 
a flight-rated engine in the 5000 megawatt class,  together with a propulsion stage 
module, is on the o rde r  of 5 billion dollars. Because the nuclear rocket technology 
program is already well underway, there  would appear to be little doubt that this 
propulsion type can be available for  the subject missions. Grea t  emphasis 
should be placed on the development of insulation and reliquefaction techniques 
to make practical long-term storage of hydrogen propellant in the space environ­
ment. This effort should include an adequate orbital experiments program. If 
manned planetary flyby missions a r e  conducted, it would be extremely desirable, 
if possible, to use a nuclear rocket propulsion system to execute these missions 
in  order  to gain operations experience pr ior  to attempting a manned planetary 
landing. This would require  substantially ea r l i e r  availability of a nuclear rocket 
and would imply an increase in present  annual expenditures for  nuclear rocket 
development in the near  future. Development of a 1000 megawatt (Nerva I) c lass  
flight engine is not recommended. Identifiable missions for  the nuclear rocket 
definitely require  the 5000 megawatt (Nerva 11) c lass  engipe. 
Aerodynamic braking at M a r s  was not found to be superior  to the all-
propulsive mode. It does, however, present, to some extent, an alternative to 
long-term cryogenic storage in space. Storage duration requirements a r e  r e ­
duced f rom about 14 months to about 3 to 6 months. Aerodynamic braking for 
landing of the M a r s  excursion module is, of course, essential. It would appear 
that aerodynamic braking of the interplanetary spacecraft would require  a much 
more accurate  knowledge of the Mars  atmosphere than would aerodynaniic braking 
of the M a r s  excursion module. 
Development costs for  an  advanced nuclear propulsion system s u c h  as 
ORION a r e  ra ther  uncertain at this t ime as compared to development predictions 
for a more near - te rm sys tem such as the nuclear rocket. The figure of 8 billion 
dollars used in this report  is much higher than the 3 billion dollar cost estimate 
f rom General Atomics. Specific development problems, objectives, techniques 
and proposed schedules a r e  classified. The rea l  problem at the present  t ime 
with advanced nuclear propulsion is not systems development but research  and 
technology efforts directed at proving feasibility and providing performance 
estimates. Adequate research  funding now, which would be a minute fraction 
29 
of development funds presently being expended in the propulsion a rea ,  would be 
an ektremely valuable investment i n  advanced planetary mission capability for  
the future. This comment is applicable to all forms  of advanced nuclear pro­
pulsion. Both the nuclear pulse concept and the gas core concept pose feasibility 
problems. The re  is little doubt of the technical feasibility of ORION, but this 
concept is at present politically in  disfavor. Technical feasibility of the gas core 
nuclear rocket in a useful fo rm is at Least questionable. 
PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Following are recommendations fo r  further study: 
1. Extension of this study to  refine data which were assumptional 
o r  estimated, to determine effects of varying performance data, which were in 
most cases  nominal, and to include additional data and analysis, such as f o r  
manned planetary flybys, l a rger  scale missions, and further treatment of mis ­
sions to planets other than Mars .  
2 .  Investigation of all operational aspects of using the solid core  
rocket as a planetary mission propulsion system. 
a. Experimental investigations of cryogenics in the space en­
vironment for  extended periods. 
b. Study of space operations with reactor  engines. 
3. Investigation of reliability, safety, and abort aspects of manned 
planetary missions. 
4. Continuation of programmatic analysis of reasonable future 
space program alternatives, as is being carr ied out by the MSFC Future Pro­
jects Office, ' to predict probable funding schedules which ,could be allocated to  
manned planetary activity. This in turn will make possible laying out of reason­
able technology programs aimed at this objective. 
5. Study of unconventional manned planetary mission modes not rep­
resented in this report .  If probable extraterrestr ia l  exploration experience to be 
gained on the Moon is properly taken into account, it is possible that such mis­
sion modes could, at insignificant o r  modest increase in r isk,  provide manyfold 
increases in planetary program effectiveness. 
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6. Detailed analysis of the problems associated with stockpiling 
and launching, at short  intervals,  of 5 to  15 Saturn V 's  as required to initiate a 
manned Mars  landing mission. 
31 
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